Abstract. It is well known that two random variables X and Y with the same range can be viewed as being equal (in a well-defined sense) with probability 1 − d(X, Y ), where d(X, Y ) is their statistical distance, which in turn is equal to the best distinguishing advantage for X and Y . In other words, if the best distinguishing advantage for X and Y is , then with probability 1 − they are completely indistinguishable. This statement, which can be seen as an information-theoretic version of a hardcore lemma, is for example very useful for proving indistinguishability amplification results. In this paper we prove the computational version of such a hardcore lemma, thereby extending the concept of hardcore sets from the context of computational hardness to the context of computational indistinguishability. This paradigm promises to have many applications in cryptography and complexity theory. It is proven both in a nonuniform and a uniform setting. For example, for a weak pseudorandom generator (PRG) for which the (computational) distinguishing advantage is known to be bounded by (e.g. = 1 2 ), one can define an event on the seed of the PRG which has probability at least 1 − and such that, conditioned on the event, the output of the PRG is essentially indistinguishable from a string with almost maximal min-entropy, namely log(1/(1 − )) less than its length. As an application, we show an optimally efficient construction for converting a weak PRG for any < 1 into a strong PRG by proving that the intuitive construction of applying an extractor to an appropriate number of independent weak PRG outputs yields a strong PRG. This improves strongly over the best previous construction for security amplification of PRGs which does not work for ≥ 1 2 and requires the seed of the constructed strong PRG to be very long.
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(Weak) Pseudorandomness
Randomness is a central resource in cryptography. In many applications, true randomness must be replaced by pseudorandomness, for example when it needs to be reproduced at a second location and one can only afford to transmit a short value to be used as the seed of a so-called pseudorandom generator (PRG). An example are cryptographic applications where a key agreement protocol yields only a short key. More generally, PRGs are a central building block in cryptographic protocols and are used in different applications where a random functionality (e.g. a uniform random function) must be realized from a short secret key.
The concept of a PRG was first proposed by Blum and Micali [BM82] , initiating a large body of literature dealing with various aspects of pseudorandomness: More formally, a random variable X is said to be pseudorandom if it is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed random variable U with the same range, i.e., no computationally bounded (i.e., polynomial time) distinguisher can tell X and U apart with better than negligible advantage. In particular, a PRG G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (for > k) extends a uniform random string U k of length k into a pseudorandom string G(U k ) of length .
Computational infeasibility is at the core of cryptographic security. In contrast to cryptographic primitives (like a one-way function f ) assuring that a certain value (e.g. the input of f ) cannot efficiently be computed, the notion of computational indistinguishability is substantially more involved. It is hence not a surprise that all constructions (cf. e.g. [HILL99, HHR06, Hol06] ) of a PRG from an arbitrary 1 one-way function f are too inefficient (in terms of the number of calls to f ) to be of any practical use.
Therefore, it appears much more difficult to propose a cryptographic function that can be believed to be a PRG than one that can be believed to be a one-way function. As a consequence, a prudent approach in cryptography is to make weaker assumptions about a concrete proposal for a PRG G. One possible way 2 to achieve this is by considering a so-called -pseudorandom generator ( -PRG) , where the best distinguishing advantage of an efficient distinguisher is not necessarily negligible, but instead bounded by some noticeable quantity , such as a constant (e.g. = 0.75), or even a function in the security parameter k mildly converging to 1 (e.g. 1 − for all inputs x = x 1 . . . x m ∈ {0, 1} km (with x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ {0, 1} k ). As pointed out in [MT09], Yao's XOR-lemma [Yao82, GNW95] yields a direct proof of security amplification for the construction SUM, and an improved bound can be obtained using the tools from [MT09] . (An independent proof with a weaker bound was also given in [DIJK09] .) Namely, one can show that if G is an -PRG, then SUM G is a (2 m−1 m + ν)-PRG, where ν is a negligible function. Also, the result extends to the case where ⊕ is replaced by any quasi-group operation . However, this construction has two major disadvantages: First, security amplification is inherently limited to the case < 1 2 . For instance, the security of a PRG with a very large stretch and with one constant output bit is not amplified by the SUM construction, even if all other output bits are pseudorandom. Second, the construction is expanding only when > k · m. Note that this issue cannot be overcome by first extending the output size of the weak PRG, due to the high security loss in the extension which would yield an -PRG with close to one. OUR CONSTRUCTION. In this paper, we provide the first solution which amplifies the security of an -PRG G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} for any < 1. Our construction, called concatenate and extract (CaE), takes input x = x 1 . . . x m r, where x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ {0, 1} k and r ∈ {0, 1} d , and outputs
where Ext : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} n is a sufficiently good strong randomness extractor. In particular, a good instantiation (for instance using two-universal hash functions or even appropriate deterministic extractors) allows to achieve n ≈ (1 − )m · − log , and we show the resulting output length n + d to be optimal with respect to constructions combining m outputs of an -PRG.
We provide security proofs both in the non-uniform and in the uniform models, which follow as an application of a new characterization of computational indistinguishability that we present in this paper, and which we outline in the next section.
Finally, we point out that the idea of concatenating strings with weaker pseudorandomness guarantees and then extracting the resulting computational entropy was previously used (most notably in constructions of PRGs from one-way functions [HILL99, Hol06, HHR06] ): However, all these previous results only consider individual independent bits which are hard to compute (given some other part of the concatenation), whereas our result is the first to deal with the more general case of weakly pseudorandom strings.
A Tight Characterization of Computational Indistinguishability
Let X and Y be random variables with the same range U. Assume that we can show that there exist events A and B defined on the choices of X and Y by some conditional probability distributions P A|X and P B|Y such that P[A] ≥ 1 − , P[B] ≥ 1 − , and X and Y are identically distributed when conditioned on A and B, respectively. Then this implies that the advantage
is upper bounded by for every distinguisher D. However, is the converse also true? Namely, if the best distinguishing advantage is upper bounded by , do such two events always exist?
An affirmative answer is known to exist if we maximize over all distinguishers: In this case, the best advantage is the statistical distance
and it is always possible to define two such events A and B by the joint probabilities
. This can be interpreted as saying the the random variables X and Y are equal with probability 1 − . A generalization of this property to discrete systems was considered by Maurer, Pietrzak, and Renner [MPR07] . However, the quantity of interest in the cryptographic setting (as for example in the definition of a PRG) is the best distinguishing advantage of a computationally bounded (i.e. polynomial-time) distinguisher, which in general is substantially smaller than the statistical distance d(X, Y ), and hence the above property is of no help in the context of computational indistinguishability.
The main technical and conceptual contribution of this paper is a computational version of the above characterization, which we prove both in the uniform and the non-uniform settings. Roughly speaking, we show that if the advantage of every computationally bounded distinguisher is bounded by (and the statistical distance may be considerably higher), there exist events A and B occurring each with probability 1 − such that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable when conditioned on A and B. This can be seen as a hardcore lemma for the setting of computational indistinguishability, and hence solves, for the case of random variables, an open question stated by Myers [Mye03] .
The security of the aforementioned concatenate-and-extract approach follows then from the simple observation, due to our characterization, that the output of an -PRG can be shown to have high computational min-entropy with probability 1 − , and hence the concatenation of sufficiently many such outputs always contains enough randomness to be extracted.
Outline of this Paper
The main part of this paper is Section 3, which is devoted to discussing the characterizations of computational indistinguishability in terms of events in both the uniform and the non-uniform computational models. Furthermore, Section 4 is devoted to proving the soundness of the concatenate-and-extract approach for security amplification of PRGs. All tools employed throughout this paper are introduced in Section 2, where in particular we discuss the hardcore lemma in the uniform and non-uniform computational models, which is a central component of our main proofs.
Preliminaries

Notational Preliminaries and Computational Model
NOTATION. Recall that a function is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. We use both notations poly and negl as placeholders for some polynomial and negligible function, respectively. In particular, a function γ = 1 poly is called noticeable. Throughout this paper, we use calligraphic letters X , Y, . . . to denote sets, upper-case letters X, Y, . . . to denote random variables, and lower-case letters x, y, . . . denote the values they take on. Moreover, P[A] stands for the probability of the event A, while we use the shorthands P X (x) := P[X = x], P A|X (x) := P[A|X = x], and P X|A (x) := P[X = x|A]. Also, P X , P A|X and P X|A are the corresponding (conditional) probability distributions, and x $ ← P is the action of sampling a concrete value x according to the distribution P. (We use x $ ← X in the case where P is the uniform distribution on X .) Finally, E[X] is the expected value of the (real-valued) random variable X. Also, we use to denote the concatenation of binary strings. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL. The notation A O (x, x , . . .) denotes the (oracle) algorithm A which runs on inputs x, x , . . . with access to the oracle O. In the asymptotic setting, a uniform algorithm A always obtains the unary representation 1 k of the current security parameter k as its first input and is said to run in time t : N → N (or to have time complexity t) if for all k > 0 the worst-case number of steps it takes (counting oracle queries as single steps) on first input 1 k , taken over all randomness values, all compatible additional inputs and oracles, is at most t(k). In particular, we say that a family of functions F = {f k } k∈N , where f k : X k → Y k is efficiently (or polynomial-time) computable if there exists a uniform algorithm which for every security parameter k computes f k . Finally, we model as usual non-uniform algorithms in terms of (families of) circuits C : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n with bounded size.
For ease of notation, we do not make asymptotics explicit in this paper (in particular, we omit the input 1 k ), despite the formal statements being asymptotic in nature.
Pseudorandom Generators and Randomness Extractors
DISTANCE MEASURES. The distinguishing advantage of the distinguisher D in distinguishing random variables X and Y with equal range U is
whereas the statistical distance between X and Y is defined as
where U k and U are uniformly distributed k-and -bit strings, respectively. (In the non-uniform setting we rather use the notation (s, )-PRG, maximizing over all circuits with size at most s.) Furthermore, we use the shorthands -PRG and PRG for (poly, )-and (poly, negl)-PRGs, respectively. RANDOMNESS EXTRACTORS. A source S is a set of probability distributions, and an -extractor for S is an efficiently computable function Ext : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} n such that for a uniformly distributed d-bit string R, we have d(Ext(X, R), U n ) ≤ for all m-bit random variables X with P X ∈ S and a uniformly distributed n-bit string U n . Furthermore, the extractor is called strong if the stronger condition
Also recall that the min-entropy of X is H ∞ (X) := − log (max x∈X P X (x)). A two-parameter function
where is the multiplication of binary strings interpreted as elements of GF (2 m ), and | n outputs the first n bits of a given string. Two-universal hash functions are good extractors:
n is a strong -extractor for the source of m-bit random variables with min-entropy at least n + 2 log 1 .
We also note that extractors with smaller seed exist for the source of random variables with guaranteed min-entropy. We refer the reader to [Sha02] for a survey. DETERMINISTIC EXTRACTORS. An extractor is deterministic if d = 0, i.e., no additional randomness is needed. (Note that such extractors are vacuously strong.) A class of sources allowing for deterministic extraction are so-called (m, , k)-total-entropy independent sources [KRVZ06] , consisting of random variables of the form (X 1 , . . . , X m ), where X 1 , . . . , X m are independent -bit strings, and the total min-entropy of (X 1 , . . . , X m ) is at least k. 4 In particular, the following extractor from [KRVZ06] will be useful for our purposes. (Unconditional constructions requiring a higher entropy rate δ are also given in [KRVZ06] .) 4 Note that in this case H∞(X1, . . . , Xm) = m i=1 H∞(Xi).
Theorem 1 ([KRVZ06]).
Under the assumption that primes with length in [τ, 2τ ] can be found in time poly(τ ), there is a constant η such that for all m, ∈ N and all δ > ζ > (m ) −η , there exists a polynomial-time computable -extractor Ext : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n for (m, , δ · m )-total-entropy independent sources, where n = (δ − ζ)m and = e −(m ) Ω(1) .
Measures and the Hardcore Lemma
GUESSING ADVANTAGES. Let (X, B) be a pair of correlated random variables with joint probability distribution P XB , where B is binary, and let A be an adversary taking an input in the range X of X and outputting a bit (i.e., A has the same form as a distinguisher): The guessing advantage of A in guessing B given X is
In particular, Guess A (B | X) = 1 means that A is always correct in guessing B given X, whereas it always errs if Guess
Intuitively, it captures the notion of a "fuzzy" characteristic function of a subset of X . Consequently, its size |M| is defined as x∈X M(x), and its density is µ(M) := |M|/|X |. Also one associates with each measure M the probability distribution P M such that P M (x) := M(x)/|M|, and we say that a random variable M is sampled according to M if
The following lemma shows that such random variables have high min-entropy, as long as M is sufficiently dense.
Lemma 2. Let M : X → [0, 1] be a measure with density µ(M) ≥ δ, and let M be sampled according to
THE HARDCORE LEMMA. For a set W, let g : W → Y be a function, and let P : W → {0, 1} be a predicate. The so-called hardcore lemma shows that, roughly speaking, if Guess
) ≤ γ for all efficient adversaries A and for W sampled according to M. This result was first introduced and proven by Impagliazzo [Imp95] . However, his original proof only ensures µ(M) ≥ 1−δ 2 . The following theorem, due to Holenstein [Hol05] , gives a tight version of the lemma for the non-uniform setting.
Theorem 2 (Non-Uniform Hardcore Lemma). Let g : W → X and P : W → {0, 1} be functions, and let δ, γ ∈ (0, 1) and s > 0 be given. If for all circuits C with size s we have
and such that all circuits C with size s = s·γ 2 32 log |W| satisfy Guess
5 In particular, flipping the output bit of such an A yields an adversary that is always correct.
A slightly weaker statement holds in the uniform setting, where we can only show that for every polynomialtime adversary A there exists a measure M for which Guess A (P (W ) | g(W )) ≤ γ even if A is allowed to query the measure M as an oracle 6 before obtaining g(W ). This is captured by the following theorem also due to Holenstein [Hol05] .
Theorem 3 (Uniform Hardcore Lemma). Let g : W → X , P : W → {0, 1}, δ : N → [0, 1], and γ : N → [0, 1] be functions computable in time poly(k), where δ and γ are both noticeable. Assume that for all polynomial-time adversaries A we have
, whose oracle queries are independent of their input 7 , there exists a measure M on W with µ(M) ≥ 1 − δ such that Guess
The independence requirement on oracle queries is due to the hardcore lemma of [Hol05] considering a model with uniform adversaries A which are given oracle access to M (with no input) and subsequently output a circuit for guessing P (W ) out of g(W ) (which in particular does not make queries to M). The simpler statement of Theorem 3 follows by standard techniques.
Note that in contrast to [Imp95, Hol05] , and the traditional literature on the hardcore lemma, we swap the roles of δ and 1 − δ in order to align our statements with the (natural) information-theoretic intuition. Also, note that both theorems have equivalent versions in terms of hardcore sets (i.e., where M(x) ∈ {0, 1}), yet we limit ourselves to considering the measure versions in this paper.
EFFICIENT SAMPLING FROM MEASURES. Sometimes, we need to sample a random element according to a measure M on X with µ(M) ≥ δ (for a noticeable δ) given only oracle access to this measure. A solution to this is to sample a random element x $ ← X and then output x with probability M(x), and otherwise go to the next iteration (and abort if a maximal number of iterations k is achieved.) It is easy to see that if an output is produced, it has the right distribution, whereas the probability that no output is produced is at most (1 − δ) k < e −δk , and can hence be made smaller than any α > 0 by choosing k = 1 δ ln 1 α . In the following, we assume that the sampling can be done perfectly, neglecting the inherent small error probability in the analysis.
3 Characterizing Computational Indistinguishability via Hardcore Theorems
Non-Uniform Case
This section considers a setting with two efficiently computable functions E : U → X and F : V → X , and we define the random variables X := E(U ) and Y := F (V ), where U and V are uniformly 8 distributed on U and V, respectively. Note that this is the usual way to capture that X and Y are efficiently samplable, where typically U and V both consist of bit strings of some length.
Let us now assume that ∆ D (X, Y ) ≤ for every efficient distinguisher D. In full analogy with the information-theoretic setting [MPR07] , we aim at extending the random experiments where E(U ) and F (V ) 6 That is, the oracle M answers a query x with M(x) ∈ [0, 1]. 7 In particular, they only depend on the randomness of the distinguisher and previous oracle queries. 8 In fact, our results can naturally be generalized to the case where U and V have arbitrary distributions by considering a slightly more general version of Theorem 2 with arbitrary distributions for W .
are sampled by adjoining, for all γ > 0, corresponding events A and B defined by conditional probability distributions P A|U and P B|V , such that both events occur with probability roughly 1 − , and, conditioned on A and B, respectively, the random variables E(U ) and F (V ) can be distinguished with advantage at most γ by an efficient distinguisher. Note that for notational convenience (and in order to interpret the result as a hardcore lemma), we describe the conditional probability distributions P A|U and P B|V in terms of measures M : U → [0, 1] and N : V → [0, 1]. In particular, the values M(u) and N (v) take the roles of P A|U (u) and P B|V (v), and note that µ(M) =
= P U |A (u). This is summarized by the following theorem. We refer the reader to Section 3.2 for its proof.
Theorem 4 (Non-Uniform Indistinguishability Hardcore Lemma). Let E : U → X and F : V → X be functions, and let , γ ∈ (0, 1) and s > 0 be given. If for all distinguishers D with size s we have
for all distinguishers D with size s := s·γ 2 128(log |U |+log |V|+1) , where
We stress that the measures M and N given by the theorem generally depend on γ and s. PRGS AND COMPUTATIONAL ENTROPY. As an example application of Theorem 4, we instantiate the function E by an (s, )-PRG G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (in particular U := {0, 1} k and X := {0, 1} ), whereas F is the identity function and V = X = {0, 1} . For any γ > 0, Theorem 4 implies that we can define an event A on the choice of the seed of the PRG (with P A|U (u) := M(u)) occurring with probability P[A] = µ(M) ≥ 1 − such that conditioned on A, no distinguisher with size s can achieve advantage higher than γ in distinguishing the -bit PRG output from an -bit string U sampled according to N , which, by Lemma 2, has min-entropy at least − log 1 1− . In other words, the output of every -PRG G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} exhibits (with probability 1 − ) high computational min-entropy. Note that the achieved form of computational entropy is somewhat weaker than the traditional notion of HILL min-entropy [HILL99] , where the random variable U is the same for all polynomially bounded s and all noticeable γ > 0. Still, it is strong enough to allow for the use of G's output in place of some string which has high min-entropy with probability 1 − .
Proof of Theorem 4
We start by defining a function g : U × V × {0, 1} → X and a predicate P : U × V × {0, 1} → {0, 1} such that
and P (u, v, b) := b for all u ∈ U and v ∈ V. It is well known that for any two random variables U and V , and a distinguisher D, the distinguishing advantage ∆ D (E( U ), F ( V )) can equivalently be characterized in terms of the probability that D guesses the uniform random bit B in a game where it is given E( U ) if B = 0 and F ( V ) otherwise: In particular, we have
for a uniform random bit B, where U , V , and B are sampled independently. We now assume towards a contradiction that for all pairs of measures M and N , both with density at least 1 − , there exists a distinguisher D of size at most s with
and V $ ← P N . We prove that, under this assumption, for all measures M on U × V × {0, 1} with µ(M) ≥ 1 − there exists a circuit C with size s such that Guess
As this contradicts the statement of the non-uniform hardcore lemma (Theorem 2) for γ 2 (instead of γ), this implies that there must be a circuit C with size s such that
In turn, this contradicts the assumed indistinguishability of E(U ) and F (V ), concluding the proof.
REDUCTION TO THE HARDCORE LEMMA. In the remainder of this proof, let us assume that we are given a measure M on U × V × {0, 1} with µ(M) ≥ 1 − . We first define the measures M 0 and M 1 on U and V, respectively, such that 
The goal is to define two measures M 0 on U and M 1 on V, both with density at least 1 − , such that a distinguisher D achieving advantage larger than γ in distinguishing E( U ) and F ( V ) for U $ ← P M 0 and V $ ← P M 1 also achieves advantage higher than γ/2 in guessing B given g(U , V , B ). Ideally, we would set M b := M b , but note that µ(M 0 ) < 1 − possibly holds. We slightly modify M 0 in order to satisfy this property, i.e., we define for all u ∈ U and v ∈ V
(We tacitly assume µ(M 0 ) < 1, otherwise we can simply set M 0 := M 0 .) It is easy to verify that M 0 (u) ≤ M 0 (u) ≤ 1. Moreover,
This implies, by our assumption, that for U and V sampled according to M 0 and M 1 there exists D such that
We now show that the advantage of D in guessing B given g(U , V , B ) is larger than γ 2 . To this aim, we introduce the following two probability distributions P 1 and P 2 , both with range (U × {0}) ∪ (V × {1}). The former distribution is the distribution of (g ( U , V , B) , B) for
The latter is the distribution of (g(U , V , B ), B ) for (U , V , B )
We prove the following two lemmas for (X 1 , B 1 )
Proof. Consider the distinguisher D which given a pair (x, b) ∈ (U × {0}) ∪ (V × {1}) outputs 1 if b = 0 and D (E(x)) = 0, or if b = 1 and D (F (x)) = 1. Then, note that by (1)
by the definition of g. The fact that
implies the lemma.
using the fact that |M| = 2 · µ(M) · |U | · |V|. This yields
. Therefore, we conclude the proof of Theorem 4 by combining both lemmas, which show that the advantage of C := D is larger than γ/2, as desired.
The Uniform Case
In this section, we prove a uniform version of Theorem 4 in the same spirit as the uniform hardcore lemma (Theorem 3): If E(U ) and F (V ) can only be distinguished with advantage by a polynomial-time distinguisher, then for all noticeable γ > 0 and for all polynomial-time oracle distinguishers D (·,·) (making input-independent oracle queries), there exist two measures M and N on U and V, each with density 1 − , such that D M,N cannot achieve advantage better than γ in telling E(U ) and F (V ) apart, where U 
where
Proof of Theorem 5
APPROACH. Throughout this proof, we use g and P as defined in the proof of Theorem 4. Towards a contradiction, we start by assuming the existence of a distinguisher D such that , b ) ) where queries to M0 and M1 are answered as
// decide whether to negate b 
Below, we show that (except with exponentially small probability) both measures M 0 and M 1 have density at least 1 − . 9 Finally, it is not hard to see that all oracle queries made by A do not depend on the distribution of the input g(u , v , b ), due to the input-independence of the queries made by D . m . We additionally define the event E that the estimation error is larger than γ/34, i.e., |ϕ 0 − m 0 m | > γ/34: Hoeffding's inequality (Lemma 6) yields
In the remainder of the analysis we assume that E does not occur, i.e., that |ϕ 0 − m 0 m | ≤ γ/34. Furthermore, we consider two cases depending on the outcome of the if-statement. . This can be used to derive
Also note that over the random choice of the valuesv 1 , . . . ,v λ 0 andû 1 , . . . ,û λ 1 , the expectations satisfy E
In particular, we call the chosen valuesv 1 , . . . ,v λ 0 andû 1 , . . . ,û λ 1 good if
are satisfied for all u ∈ U and for all v ∈ V. The probability that they are not good (we call this event B) is upper bounded by (using Hoeffding's inequality and the union bound) by
From now on, we assume that B does not occur, and fix some good valuesv 1 , . . . ,v λ 0 andû 1 , . . . ,û λ 1 . In this case, both distributions M 0 and M 1 have density at least 1 − , as shown by the following claim.
Proof. The fact that B does not occur and rearranging terms in the definition of M 0 (u) yield
and the statement can be shown in an analogous way for M 1 .
By our assumption on D , the claim implies that
with advantage larger than γ. Also, let B be the event that π 0 and π 1 are more than γ/2 off from the actual probabilities that the distinguisher outputs 1, then
Given B does not occur, we have
The remainder of this proof also shows that D ⊕ δ performs sufficiently well in guessing the bit B given g(U , V , B ) for a triple (U , V , B ) sampled according to M. To this aim, we consider the two probability distribution P 1 and P 2 , both with range (U × {0}) ∪ (V × {1}), defined as in the proof of Theorem 4, but we respect to the newly defined M 0 and M 1 . In particular, we can still use Lemma 3 using the upper bound on the statistical distance d((
given by the following lemma.
We bound the first sum, as, by symmetry, the same bound can be shown on the second sum. We first note that, by the fact that B does not occur,
where we have used the fact that 1 − .
We can substitute (3) and (4) into the first sum of (2) to obtain CONSTRUCTION. Let G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} and Ext : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} n be efficiently computable functions. We consider the Concatenate-and-Extract (CaE) construction CaE G,Ext : {0, 1} mk+d → {0, 1} n+d such that
for all x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ {0, 1} k and r ∈ {0, 1} d .
PARAMETERS AND MAIN SECURITY STATEMENT. The intuition justifying the security of the CaE construction relies on the simple observation that, provided that G is an -PRG, each individual and independent PRG output in the concatenation G(X 1 ) · · · G(X m ) (for uniform X 1 , . . . , X m ) has computational minentropy at least −log 1 1− with probability at least 1− , and thus we can expect the whole concatenation to have computational min-entropy ≈ m · (1 − ) · − log 1 1− with very high probability, which can be extracted if Ext is an appropriate extractor. Note that the resulting construction is expanding if n/mk > 1, and for an optimal extractor this ratio is roughly (1 − ) − log 1 1− /k (we ignore the entropy loss of the extractor for simplicity), or, turned around, our construction expands if the underlying -PRG satisfies /k > 1 1− + log 1 1− /k holds. In particular, this value is independent of m. In Section 4.3, we show that for a large class of natural constructions this is essentially optimal. For example, for = 1 2 , the output length of the given generator G needs to be slightly larger than 2k in order to achieve expansion. For comparison, the SUM construction is expanding if /k > m, where m = ω(k/ log(1/ )) in order for the construction to be secure.
Also, the fact that all -bit blocks are independent allows for using deterministic extractors in the CaE construction, such as the one given by Theorem 1, as long as
The following theorem proves the soundness of the above intuition. Then the function CaE G,Ext : {0, 1} mk+d → {0, 1} n+d is a (e −ρ 2 m +δ+ν)-PRG, where ν is a negligible function.
[0, 1] operates as follows: First, it chooses m k-bit strings x 1 , . . . , x m independently and uniformly at random, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} an independent coin is flipped (taking value 1 with probability M(x i ), and 0 otherwise), and if the coin flip returns 1, the position i is marked as "being in the measure". Let G be the set of marked positions. Subsequently, an index i * is chosen uniformly random from {1, . . . , m}. Then, a string y 1 . . . y m ∈ {0, 1} m (where y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ {0, 1} ) is built as follows: Each y i is set to an independent element sampled according to P N if i ∈ G and i < i * , and in any other case it is set to G(x i ). Finally, the distinguisher chooses the seed r for the extractor uniformly at random, and outputs the bit D(Ext(y 1 . . . y i * −1 z y i * +1 . . . y m , r) r) if i * ∈ G holds, or it outputs D(Ext(y 1 . . . y m , r) r) else (in particular, the input z is ignored in this latter case). ANALYSIS. In the following, let M and N both have density 1 − , let X be sampled according to P M , and let U be sampled according to P N . We compute the average advantage
It is convenient to use the shorthands P[D (·) | g] := P[D (X) = 1 | |G| = g] to denote the conditional probability of D outputting 1 on input X given that |G| = g ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m}. Similarly, we denote
. . . , m} and i * = {2, . . . , m}, and we hence obtain
On the one hand, we now remark that
On the other hand, because µ(N ) ≥ 1 − , whenever g ≥ (1 − − ρ)m and i * = m, the distribution of As the queries of D do not depend on the inputs, and the above lower bound on its advantage holds for all measures M and N with density at least 1 − , the distinguisher D contradicts Theorem 5 for γ := η m , which is noticeable, and implies that G is not an -PRG, which is a contradiction.
Optimality of the Output Length
This final section discusses the optimality of the output length of the concatenate-and-extract construction with respect to the class of constructions which operate by combining a number of independent outputs from weak PRGs, and such that the corresponding security reduction is black-box. In particular, the reduction only exploits the capability of efficiently sampling a given distribution. 10 This is formally summarized by the following definition. Definition 1. A black-box ( , )-indistinguishability amplifier consists of a pair of polynomial-time algorithms (C, S) with the following two properties:
(i) For some functions m, d, and h, the algorithm C implements a function family {0, 1} m × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} h , where the second input parameter models explicitly the d-bit randomness used by the algorithm C. (ii) Let P X be an arbitrary distribution on the -bit strings which is sampled by an algorithm X, let X 1 , . . . , X m be independent samples of P X , and let R and U h be uniformly distributed d-and h-bit strings, respectively. Then, for every distinguisher D such that
for infinitely many values of the security parameter and a noticeable function γ, we have ∆ S D,X (X, U ) > for infinitely many values of the security parameter, where X $ ← P X and U is a uniform -bit string.
The following theorem shows that the output length achieved by concatenate-and-extract is essentially optimal. 11 Proof. In the following, assume for simplicity that − log 1 1− is an integer. Consider the probability distribution P X on the -bit strings such that with probability the string 0 is selected, whereas otherwise with probability 1− an -bit string z 0 log( This distribution can be sampled by a function X : {0, 1} → {0, 1} which outputs its input x if the last log 1 1− bits are all 0, whereas it outputs all-zero string in any other case. It is easy to verify that d(X, U ) = for a uniform -bit string U . Furthermore, recall that the Shannon entropy of X is H(X) := − x∈X P X (x) log P X (x), which is noticeable, due to h being polynomial in the security parameter.
To conclude the proof note that if a corresponding S existed so that (C, S) is an ( , )-computational indistinguishability amplifier, then it would transform the optimal information-theoretic distinguisher D (achieving advantage at least 1 4h ) into a distinguisher S D,X distinguishing X from random with advantage better than , which contradicts the fact that d(X, U ) = .
